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When the media reported in 2010 that Missouri Sentencing Advisory
Commission is listing the “cost” of each sentencing option on its Web site, the
reaction ranged from “outrageous” to “good idea.”2 Now that more than a year
has passed and the world has not ended, the time for cool reflection is here; my
purpose is to set forth the context and rationale for this innovation.
Missouri has a discretionary sentencing regimen. Judges are allowed to
sentence within the authorized ranges of four felony classes. Although some
offenses are subject to mandatory minimum prison time, the majority of offenses
allow probation or a short prison sentence followed by probation (referred to as
120-day “shock” or treatment). Judges’ discretion often is shaped by a plea
agreement.
Layered onto this discretionary sentencing regimen is the work of the
Missouri Sentencing Advisory Commission, an eleven-member group whose tiny
budget (about $73,000 per year) must suffice to create a system of recommended
sentencing – a goal that the commission achieves through the cooperation of the
Department of Corrections, the Board of Probation and Parole, and the judiciary.
The commission’s System of Recommended Sentencing is based on the
work of the corrections department’s statisticians.3 The System of Recommended
Sentences consists of a matrix of 300 recommended sentences that take into
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account the offense severity and the offender’s prior criminal history. The
recommended sentence for each offense is based on the felony class (there are four
classes), the offense group (there are five offense groups) and a statistically
computed measure of offense seriousness (there are three levels: low, medium and
high).
The offender’s prior criminal history is scored on a five-point range – level
1 is an offender with no prior felonies and no more than four misdemeanors; level
5 is an offender with four or more unrelated felonies and three or more unrelated
prison sentences.
The offense severity part of the sentencing matrix uses an aggregation of
offenses because if the recommended sentences were based on actual sentencing
for each offense, there would be many offenses for which there are insufficient
data to compute reliable sentencing averages – for instance, in 2010, there were
sentences recommended for 385 different offenses, but only 82 offenses had more
than 50 sentences in that year.
For each felony offense, the commission’s sentencing recommendations list
three suggested sentences –
(1)

A “typical” sentence, which is statistically determined to be the
most common for that offense for an offender with a particular
criminal history.

(2)

An “aggravated” sentence – that is, more than the typical – where
the circumstances of the crime would indicate to the judge that a
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penalty more harsh than “typical” might be appropriate. If the
offenders scores “poor” or “below average” on the risk
assessment scale, the commission recommends that aggravated
sentence.
(3)

A “mitigated” sentence – that is, less than typical – where the
circumstances of the offense would warrant a lighter than typical
sentence. The commission recommends a mitigating sentence
where the offender is rated a “good” risk for not re-offending,
unless there are aggravating circumstances shown by the facts of
the crime.4

A judge can order a Sentencing Assessment Report, prepared by a
probation officer, that discusses the details of the offense, the impact on the
victim, if any, the criminal history of the offender, and an assessment of the risk of
re-offending; the report sets forth the three ranges of punishment as determined by
the sentencing commission – aggravated, typical, and mitigated sentencing options
for that offense and that category of offender. Each of the three sentencing
options also is accompanied by information, where a prison term is possible, as to
the parole board’s guidelines for release and the parole board’s record of releases
of similarly assessed offenders incarcerated for that offense or similar offense.
The sentencing commission, with the cooperation of the Department of
Corrections and the Board of Probation and Parole, has developed this
information-based system over the past seven years. The statisticians of the
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corrections department have maintained the data on which the system is based,
data that have tracked Missouri offenders for at least the past 25 years.5
The commission and the department have made many modifications in the
manner in which the data, the sentencing information, and risk assessment
information are communicated to the judges, lawyers, probation officers, and to
the public.6
Automated Sentencing Information
Because judges order Sentencing Assessment Reports only in about 20
percent of cases, the commission several years ago developed an Automated
Sentencing Information feature on the commission’s Web site,
www.mosac.mo.gov. Based on surveys and anecdotal reports, the commission has
found that attorneys use the Automated Sentencing Information feature to gather
information for plea negotiation and, especially with defendants and their families,
to get a realistic idea of the sentencing possibilities in the event of a guilty plea.
To use the Automated Sentencing Information feature, the user needs to put
in 11 pieces of information, six of which include information related to the
offender’s prior criminal history, the offense charged, and the defendant’s age,
education level, job status (either at the time of offense or sentencing), and drug
abuse status.7 These characteristics of the offender are statistically correlated with
the risk of re-offending.
When the user enters this information, the Automated Recommended
Sentencing Information feature will produce
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the three options for a “recommended sentence,”
an offender risk assessment,
the expected time served for any prison sentence,
the recidivism after two years for offender in this risk category who
have been sentenced for this crime, and
the costs of incarceration and supervision.
An Example
In an example, the commission presents a hypothetical offender who pleads
guilty to second-degree robbery, which is the forcible taking of property (without
causing injury or using a gun, which would be first-degree robbery); the offender
is male, 20 years old, has a high school diploma, has no prior felonies, has had a
part-time job for two months prior to his arrest, and he is suspected of substance
abuse.8 With these characteristics, the offender is rated “above average” on the
risk assessment – a scale that ranks an offender “good” (lowest risk of recidivism),
“above average,” “average,” or “poor” (highest risk of recidivism). The
Automated Sentencing Information feature provides the following information as
to each sentencing option:
“Typical” sentence is a “Community Structured Sentence,” a probation
sentence with enhanced supervision. The cost for five years of
supervision is $1,792 per year, a total of $8,960. “The rate of
recidivism -- which means incarceration because of violation of
supervision or committing a new offense within two years – for
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offenders with this offender’s prior criminal history and risk rating is
29.7 percent.”9
“Mitigating” sentence is regular probation. The cost per year is $1,354,
or $6,770 for five years. “The recidivism rate is 29.7 percent for
offenders with this individual’s risk rating who are placed on probation
for second-degree robbery.”
“Aggravating” sentence is five years in prison. For prison terms the
Automated Sentencing Information feature lists the parole board’s
releasing data, which the commission describes as: “A person with this
offender’s prior criminal history and risk rating can be expected to serve
62 percent of his five-year sentence, or 3.1 years.”10 The cost of the
sentence is $54,724 (3.1 years in prison at $16,823 per year plus 1.9
years on parole at $1,354 per year.) The Automated Sentencing
Information feature also reports that the rate of recidivism for such
offenders is 39.6 percent within two years.
The 120-day “shock” probation sentencing option is available for this
offense, but is not among the three options listed as a “recommended
sentence.” This sentence allows the judge to sentence the offender to
prison, but to order a report within 120 days; near the end of the 120day period, the judge can release the offender to probation. Although
this option is not among the three “recommended” options, the
Automated Sentencing Information feature reports that the recidivism
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for this category of offender sentenced to a “shock” sentence is 39.2
percent.
The data on the cost of sentence are not included in the Sentencing
Assessment Report; they are available only on the Automated Sentencing
Information feature of the commission’s Web site. Judges are free to disregard
such data – as they are free to disregard any of the data or recommendations of the
commission or the sentencing recommendations as presented by a probation
officer in the Sentencing Assessment Report.
Why Cost and Recidivism?
Why should the cost and recidivism data be included? As a point of
argument, a defense attorney might contend that not only is the prison sentence far
more costly than the community supervision options, but also has a higher risk of
recidivism. A prosecutor may counter that the most effective way to prevent
recidivism is to sentence the offender to prison – for at least those years, the
offender will be incapacitated from committing crimes, at least on the outside.
Controversy About “Cost”
The controversy about providing cost data seems legitimate. After all, why
should a judge take cost into account? But what about the risk of recidivism? The
judge’s decision in every case takes into account the safety of the public. But
simplistic approaches fail; for instance, a judge could sentence every offender to
the statutory maximum. Although the immediate result may be fewer crimes
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committed, the ultimate result probably would be an increase in crimes – that is
the result the recidivism data suggest.
These data confirm the “Ma Joad” effect, which I take from a recent rereading of John Steinbeck’s THE GRAPES OF WRATH (1939), where Ma Joad,
when her son Tommy Joad returns home after four years in prison, asks this
worried question: “"I knowed Pretty Boy Floyd [Mr. Floyd was an alumnus of the
Missouri State Penitentiary in Jefferson City]. I knowed his ma. They was good
folks. He was full a hell, sure like a good boy oughta be. ... I don' know all like
this -- but I know it. He done a bad thing an' they hurt 'im, caught 'im an hurt him
so he was mad, an' the nex' bad thing he done was mad, an' they hurt him again.
An' purty soon he was mean-mad. They shot at him like a varmint, an' he shot
back, an' then they run him like a coyote, an' him a-snappin' an' a-snarlin', mean as
a lobo. An' he was mad. He wasn't no boy or no man no more, he was jus' a
walkin' chunk a mean-mad. But the folks that knowed him didn' hurt 'im. He
wasn' mad at them. Finally they run him down an' killed 'im. No matter how they
say it in the paper how he was bad -- that's how it was. ... I got to know, Tommy.
Did they hurt you so much? Did they make you mad like that?"
Whether it is Ma Joad or the average sentencing judge, it does seem
obvious that locking up an offender in a prison filled with criminals may not
improve him, may in fact make him worse, though prison conditions and methods
of treatment certainly have improved since the 1930s.
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If the recidivism rates are higher for prison than for non-prison sentences,
then why – a judge (or a concerned citizen) might ask – would we spend money
for incarceration unless the circumstances of the crime cry out for the retributive
effect of a prison sentence or the law requires it.11
The idea for including cost, along with recidivism data, on the
commission’s Web site came from a circuit court judge who routinely has been
involved in sentencing. Judges are citizens as well as judges, the judge said (and I
paraphrase), and they think about the problem of overspending the state’s limited
resources on over-incarceration.
To that thought I would add: if some judges do consider cost, in the
absence of published data, where do they get the information? My guess is that
they guess. If a judge is going to consider the cost to the state’s resources of
particular sentences, he or she ought to consider information that is accurate. For
instance, many people have in their heads the old saw that it is cheaper to send a
young man to Harvard than to prison. Not true, actually; Missouri’s prison costs –
$16,823 per year, have fallen way behind Ivy League tuitions that are now north of
$50,000.
The cost data are a way of asking judges – and the public – what are we
getting for our correctional dollars? Perhaps costs of incarceration ought not to be
considered in assessing punishments that are just – but there is no good reason to
keep the question of cost out of the discussion of what justice requires. Judges are
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not required to consider cost, nor are they required to consider the effects of their
sentencing on recidivism.
But most judges want to protect the public, they want their sentencing to be
rational, and they want the public to get the best bang for the buck. If they want
information about cost, why not give it to them?
As importantly, sentencing is an essential government function that judges
perform on behalf of the public. The public, in whose behalf sentencing is done,
may want to know how its dollars are being spent and whether the spending is
cost-effective. One may disagree about the value of the cost-benefit analysis these
data may encourage, but there unquestionably is a need for public discussion of
this subject. When the Sentencing Advisory Commission put its cost data into the
information mix, we knew it would provoke public discussion. And so it did.
Good for us.
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In cases where the offender is a public official who has violated the public trust, for
example, judges often sentence more harshly than the range of punishment listed in the
commission’s System of Recommended Sentencing because the sentencing
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